The DFKI conducts application-oriented basic research in the field of artificial intelligence and other related subfields of computer science. The overall goal is to construct systems with technical knowledge and common sense which -by using AI methods -implement a problem solution for a selected application area. Currently, there are the following research areas at the DFKI:
Introduction
It has recently been recognized that the development of large knowledge-based systems which can be successfully used for real world applications requires the sharing and reuse of knowledge. In the so called knowledge sharing e ort (Neches et. al., 1991) (Swartout, Neches and Patil, 1993 ) a vision and corresponding technologies are being developed so that a new system need (and must) not be constructed from scratch but can instead be developed by assembling reusable components of established knowledge such a s o n tologies that are already embodied in existing knowledge-based systems (Guha and Lenat, 1990 Breuker and Wielinga, 1989) . On the basis of shared ontologies, even speci c system implementations could be reused when building a new system.
One major working group within the knowledge sharing e ort (i.e. the Shared, Reusable Knowledge Bases group) is concerned with developing a language by which a consensus on vocabulary and semantic interpretations of domain models can be established. Gruber (1993) has termed the speci cation of a vocabulary for a shared domain consisting of de nitions of objects, concepts, classes and relations an ontology. Ideally, s u c h shared de nitions should be speci ed at the knowledge level (Newell, 1982) , independent of speci c representation languages. On the basis of these assumptions an Ontolingua has been developed. Ontolingua is an implemented system (Gruber, 1993, p. 12-2) for translating ontologies from a declarative, predicate-calculus language int o a v ariety of representation systems like a KL-ONE type system Sharing and reusing knowledge which is speci ed in some common logic that is independent of any speci c representation language is certainly of pivotal importance for developing successful knowledge-based systems. However, Clancey has recently pointed out a number of deciencies of current knowledge level speci cations and proposed respective re-interpretations (1989). Prior to this criticism, Bourne has already argued that the postulate of pure symbol manipulation processes does not set the right stage for a better understanding of complex systems. He furthermore proposed behavior descriptions which w ould yield a better understanding of the human conceptual behavior (Bourne, 1969 Bourne, Ekstrand and Dominoski, 1971 chapter 1) and which are better suited for building large knowledge-based systems.
Although, proponents of the information or symbol processing hypothesis promptly refuted the notion of behavior descriptions (Newell, 1969) , recent research clearly indicates the value and the promises of behavior descriptions and the underlying scienti c idiom. Maes (1993) has recently compared knowledge-based to behavior-based arti cial intelligence. Behaviorbased systems excelled in that such systems can be understood as a part of the environment. Their performance is consequently emerging from the interaction of the system and its environment. They are autonomous open systems and their symbols are grounded in the environment.
The goal of this paper is to provide a formalization of behavior descriptions and to show how the sharing and reuse of knowledge can be accomplished in a ever changing environment. We will rst summarize Newell's knowledge level conceptualizations and point o u t a number of shortcomings. Whereas knowledge level descriptions, which are often viewed as function-structure blueprints, describe an abstract mechanism, behavior descriptions specify the signi cant relations among various parameters of behavior. After a general exposition of behavior descriptions, it is exempli ed how behavior descriptions can be used for the documentation of arti cial systems (expert systems and computer programs in general). The sharing and reuse of knowledge is then discussed when the functionality o f a k n o wledge base is to be extended and when a knowledge base is used for purposes, which w ere not considered at design time.
Newell's knowledge level
In his in uential paper, Newell (1982) has introduced a level of computer system description called the "knowledge level". Since this time, describing arti cial and human systems as a knowledge system has become an important goal in expert system research (Clancey, 1985 Breuker and Wielinga, 1989) as well as in cognitive psychology (Pylyshyn, 1984 Anderson, 1990 ). When establishing a knowledge level description, a natural or arti cial system "is viewed as having a body of knowledge and a set of goals, so that it takes actions in the environment that its knowledge indicates will attain its goals" (Newell, 1992, p. 426 ). Knowledge systems are one level in the hierarchy of systems that make u p a n i n telligent agent. Lower level descriptions such as the symbol level specify how a k n o wledge level system is realized in mechanisms (i.e. information processing and representation). The symbol level is described by a memory, symbols, operations, interpretation processes and perceptual and motor interfaces (Newell, 1982) . Through knowledge level descriptions, Newell has thus provided us with a possibility for uniformly characterizing natural and arti cial systems.
The key assumption underlying the knowledge level is the notion of an idealized rational agent. A rational agent is assumed to have the following attributes: 1) The agent h a s t h e ability to perform a set of actions in some environment. 2) The agent has goals about how its environment should be.
3) The agent has a body of knowledge. Its body of knowledge is about the environment, its goals, its actions and the relations between them. The agent also knows all those facts that are a deductive consequence of its body of knowledge 4) The principle of rationality is its single law of behavior. It describes which actions the agent will perform: "If an agent has knowledge that one of its actions will lead to one of its goals, then the agent will select that action" (Newell, 1982, p.102) .
The behavior of an agent is a sequence of actions taken in the environment o ver time. By applying the principle of rationality, one can presumably predict the future behavior of an agent from its knowledge and its goals. Consider for example a chess player as such an ideal rational agent. It has the ability to perform a set of moves on the chess board. It has the goal of winning the game. Its body of knowledge consists of the rules of the chess game, i.e. the starting positions and the legal moves and everything that is deductively derivable from this body of knowledge. Therefore, for every chess board constellation, it knows which m o ve will make it win the game. With the principle of rationality, i t i s t h us predicted that it will play the perfect game of chess.
The assumption of such idealized rational agents has been shown to produce (at least) two substantial problems: 1) Important k n o wledge di erences cannot be expressed in a knowledge level descriptions. The symbol level must consequently be used to denote these important distinctions. This is the problem of confounded knowledge di erences. 2) A faithful implementation of a knowledge level description at the symbol level would often 3 require unlimited computational resources. The assumptions made about rational agents may t h us be too unrealistic for being particularly useful. This applies for describing human cognition (Anderson, 1990) as well as for specifying and implementing knowledge-based systems (Sticklen, 1989) . This is the problem of a too unrealistic idealisation. Sticklen has pointed out the problems of the inability to represent control, the potential computational inadequacy and the non-operational characterisation 1 .
Confounded knowledge di erences: Chess grand masters have s p e n t y ears of learning for improving their chess game. Unlike beginners, who merely know the rules of the game, chess grand masters are known to have a large vocabulary of di erent c hess board con gurations (Chase and Simon, 1973) . The chess grand masters thus certainly have more chess knowledge than the beginners. However, in a knowledge level description a la Newell there would be no di erence between the beginner and the chess grand master. Because the beginner s body of knowledge would also include everything that is deductively derivable from the rules of the game, he would be said to know e v erything a grand master can possibly know about chess. In a knowledge level description, a beginner and a grand master would thus be said to have the same chess knowledge.
According to Newell (1982 Newell ( , 1992 ), the symbollevel is described with the following attributes: 1) a memory, with independently modi able structures that contain symbols 2) symbols (patterns in the structures), providing the distal access to other structures 3) operations, taking symbol structures as input and producing symbol structures as output 4) interpretations processes, taking symbol structures as input and executing operations (the structures thereby representing these operations) and 5) Perceptual and motor interface to interact with an external environment. A symbol level description of a chess player includes its memory for the di erent t ypes of chess constellations. At the symbol level the chess grand master would thus have dramatically more chess patterns in the symbol structures (chunks) than the beginner.
Unrealistic idealisation: In order to substantiate the body of knowledge of a chess player at the symbol level, one must compute everything that is deductively derivable from the rules of the game. This problem is computationally intractable. In other words, a computational device would be needed that has in nite memory and in nite processing resources. Neither humans nor computer systems can be realistically viewed as such computational devices. Knowledge level descriptions are therefore unrealistic idealisations and not very useful. A knowledge engineer, who wants to implement an expert system from a knowledge level description of the ideal chess player, may n o t e v en achieve a rude approximation of the program speci cation given at the knowledge level (Sticklen, 1989) . Since resource limitations are a fundamental characteristic of human cognition (Miller, 1956 Norman and Bobrow, 1975 Simon, 1974 , a psychologist, who describes human behavior at the knowledge level would most frequently derive predictions, for which no supporting empirical evidence can be found.
The problems with knowledge level descriptions have been known for some time and various solutions have been proposed (Dietterich, 1986 Schreiber, Akkermans and Wielinga, 1990) . These solutions re ne Newell's knowledge level notion by imposing more detailed structures on an agent's body of knowledge. They do however not address the root of the problem. Although Newell's proposal of describing natural and arti cial systems at a uniform abstract level is extremely important for cognitive psychology and arti cial intelligence, his formulation of the knowledge level hypothesis is incomplete and/or misdirected. There are four major misconceptions: 1) Knowledge and goals are in themselves inadequate to fully characterize intelligent systems. 2) Knowledge level descriptions are developed as if intelligent systems were causal systems. 3) For this level of abstract description, the distinction between an agent and its environment is arti cial. 4) The knowledge level does not lie directly above the symbol level and there is no tight connection between them. Therefore knowledge level descriptions cannot be reduced to the symbol level (Clancey, 1991) .
Behavior descriptions
If existing knowledge level descriptions of systems are inadequate, what then does it take t o give an adequate and complete description of intelligent behavior? Knowledge is important o f course an intelligent system knows the important facts of its operative domain. But knowledge alone is inert it does not act on its own. There are other equally important parameters of intelligent behavior, which include, at a minimum, skill, i n tention , (goals or purpose) a n d performance. T o talk about the behavior of any agent, natural or arti cial, one is obliged to make, either explicitly or implicitly, some commitment to the knowledge, skill, intention (or goals) and performance of that agent. It is not enough to say that the agent has the pertinent knowledge and acts rationally. S u c h a description is at best incomplete, and at worst wrong.
Extending knowledge level descriptions
What do knowledge, intention (or goals), skill and performance entail and what does it mean to call these parameters of behavior? Basically we agree with Newell about the nature of knowledge. The knowledge is the complete set of discriminations, facts, or concepts available to an agent which h a ve been acquired from past experiences. Knowledge implies that the agent can make distinctions between and among objects, processes, events and states of a airs. It has a basis for treating some things in one way, others in a di erent w ay.
But, as the foregoing discussion might suggest, knowledge does not exist independently of, or in isolation from the way i t i s u s e d . Thus, with respect to any discrimination, fact or concept there is a corresponding skill, which represents its use. It might be helpful to think of knowledge then, in Ryle's sense, as "knowing that x is the case". Skill, then, is "knowing how to act on that knowledge" (Ryle, 1949) . The di erence captured in this distinction is the di erence between "knowing that" and "knowing how". As Ryle (1949, p32) has clearly stated knowing how cannot be de ned in terms of knowing that.
Similarly, i n tentions or goals do not exist independently of knowledge and skill. An intention is the want, desire or need to act upon some existing knowledge in a particular way.
The combinations of knowledge, skill and intention do not cause any particular behavior to be what it is. Neither do they in any i n telligible way cause an action. Rather these are merely parameters of a behavior description. But to use the term "merely" is not to minimize their importance. There might be no defensible way t o g i v e a v alid causal description of behavior.
But we are not yet nished. There is a missing ingredient. To provide a complete behavior description, it is required that some commitment be made to the knowledge, the skill, and the intention of the agent. Knowledge, skill and intentions alone provide only a description of behavior potential. What is required to complete the description of an actual behavior is some performance or action by t h e a g e n t. Please note, classical behaviorism to the contrary notwithstanding, performance is not equivalent to behavior in this descriptive system. It is merely a component or parameter of behavior, meeting the criteria of consistency and coherence. Rather than causing performance to be what it is, knowledge, skill and intention enable a certain performance in the sense that they make it feasible and intelligible when it occurs. The way w e use these concepts entails that each one of them is involved in providing a behavior description.
B=R(G,K,S,P)
where B is behavior, G are the goals or the intention, K is knowledge, S is skill, P is performance and R speci es the various relationships among G,K,S and P.
These components do not exist independently, in separate systems or in isolation. The knowledge, the skill, and the intention to engage in any action, x, are tightly interconnected. For every quantum of knowledge that allows for discrimination between x and not-x, there is some way of acting on that discrimination and some possibility that the actor will want t o take that action. Thus, it does not make sense to look for independent traces of knowledge, skill and intention in separate brain locations of storage mechanisms.
Consider that most adults are able to recognize a case of piano playing when they experience it, even if they have n o m usical training. I have su cient k n o wledge to distinguish piano from non-piano playing in most circumstances (although there might be cases in which i t would be di cult for anyone to tell). Furthermore, I have w ays of acting on that knowledge, such as calling it a case of piano playing, or a case of bad piano playing, or simply leaving the room where it is being done. I might h a ve the goal of either approaching, because it is good and I want to hear better, or avoiding, because it o ends my sensibilities. If that goal is stronger than all other immediate goals, I will take the indicated action. Having done this, I h a ve completed a behavior episode and anyone (including myself) who observed my action and had reason to know or to think about my personal knowledge, skills and intentions, would be correct in describing what happened as an act of behavior.
Because I know w h a t q u a l i e s a s p i a n o p l a ying, I can consider hypothetical cases of piano playing. The fact that I know that I know distinguishes me, as a human being capable of intelligent, intentional action, from an automaton. One might realistically say t h a t t h e thermostat "knows" how t o c o n trol room temperature, by turning a switch o and on at appropriate times. But it make no sense whatsoever to say that the thermostat "knows that it knows."
The concepts of knowledge, skill, intention and performance are necessary but possibly not su cient to give a complete description of behavior. There are other constraints of the system that might h a ve t o b e t a k en into account in the general case. For almost all purposes of the present discussion, the basic parameters will su ce.
It is tempting to liken the distinction between knowledge and skill in this descriptive system to the concepts of declarative and procedural memory in the contemporary literature of arti cial intelligence (Winograd, 1976) and cognitive psychology (Anderson, 1983 Squire and Slater, 1975 Tulving, 1975 . It is common to invoke Ryle to argue that memories c a n be either procedural or declarative.) Declarative memories are memories for facts, either at a general, conceptual or semantic level or as episodes, embedded in some time/space coordinates. Most adult human beings know, for example, the concept of a newspaper, or a meal or justice. Further they can be expected to know (at least some of) what they read in the newspaper about the U. S. presidential election at home last night. In the rst case, the knowledge is general, semantic and de-contextualized in the second case, it is embedded in an episode. In either case, the memory is fact-based, and its recollection is always conscious and deliberately achieved (note that a skill is required for this). Procedural memories are memories about doing something. These are the kinds of memories that support acquired skilful performance, as in piano playing, or repetition priming e ects, of the sort that make i t somehow easier to process a stimulus the second time around, or some classical conditioning phenomena. The basis for these memory e ects is nonconscious. It does not appear to be necessary for one to know o r t o b e a b l e t o s a y m uch about the skill of piano playing in order to play the piano (of course, one would surely know t h a t h e i s p l a ying the piano, because that's a fact). Moreover, one need not know about or be momentarily a ware of a prior episode with a stimulus in order to exhibit (but possibly not experience) a priming e ect. To make the distinction between declarative and procedural memories completely clear, some theorists argue that they belong to separate memory systems and never mix. In some cases, the argument is made that procedural memories derive from or are some compiled version of fact-based memories.
We believe that the declarative/procedural distinction is important, but probably muddled in current theorizing. First of all, while it is correct to cite Ryle in support of this distinction, it should be noted that he had a somewhat di erent meaning in mind. As in the present system, facts and skills were not independent e n tities for Ryle. Facts and skills go together. For everything you know, there corresponds a way to act upon it. One does not know a newspaper without some related actions (which can, but need not include reading it). There is no evidence of declarative memory without associated action further there is no case of intelligent action without a basis in knowledge. Which is not to say that skills and repetition e ects do not exist. It is indeed possible to exhibit skill without a lot of useful information you can communicate about it verbally or consciously. Repetition priming e ects are quite reliable. But the fact that you appear to be unable to report an earlier occurrence of the pertinent stimulus rules out only one possible thing you might know a n d uses only one possible way to assess what you know about that stimulus. There simply is no compelling evidence at the present time that di erent memory systems contain declarative and procedural memories. Thus, the distinction will require further sharpening of both a theoretical and an empirical sort. Clancey (1991, p. 386) has already pointed out that knowledge level descriptions should not be identi ed with causal mechanisms because they are observer-relative. The regularities in the performance of humans or arti cial systems should be viewed as characterizations that are descriptive. In agreement with Clancey's arguments, the relationship among the parameters of behavior is not causal. That is, the conjunction of knowledge and intention (or goals) does not cause an action. Rather the relationships that governs this descriptive system are consistency and coherence. As we will see, the component parameters must make sense together for the behavior described to be accepted as rational. Component inconsistency or incoherence produces descriptions that are irrational or incorrect or unrecognizable as intelligent behavior. In a more technical notion, a description of rational behavior thus consists of the uni cation of the parameters of behavior.
The environment is as the agent perceives it. That is, within this system, there is no point t o the assertion that the environment is one thing and the organism is another. There is no point in separating internal from external. Organisms do not just function within environments, they are part and parcel of the environment. Among other things, it is for that reason that the environment is not the same for all organisms. Now of course the environment is not entirely di erent for di erent organisms. There are regularities, and these regularities are what gives us some scienti c purchase on behavior.
The environment i s a n i n terpreted framework within which b e h a vior takes place. The environment exists for an agent only because the agent has some knowledge about what it perceives, some skills and goals to act on that knowledge, and an ability to carry forward with action or movement. E n vironments di er among people, because people di er in which way they know about what they perceive. But because to some degree knowledge is shared, environments are shared. To the extent that two people have the same knowledge, skills, goals and performance abilities they will perceive t h e e n vironment in the same way a n d t h e y will behave in the same way. The implication for knowledge-based systems is that we m ust build environments into them. The knowledge-based system must contain not only knowledge in some internal sense (and skills, goals and performance abilities), but also knowledge of the environment (something like cognition-environment relationships in standard terminology) in which the system operates.
The notion of knowledge has traditionally been used to mediate between the internal states of an agent and the states of the world. But there need not be any t i g h t coupling between the symbol processing of an arti cial system and its behavior description. Depending upon the scope and context of a behavior description an identical symbol processing and performance may result in di erent behavior descriptions. And conversely, di erent s y m bol processing procedures may b e g i v en an identical behavior description.
It is often said that science seeks explanations for natural phenomena. The study of intelli-gent systems (of the empirical and engineering sciences) is, as it should be, fully as scienti c as any of its kindred enterprises. Yet, the system we h a ve presented is called a descriptive system its goal is to supply complete behavior descriptions. We d o n o t i n tend, by the use of this term, to diminish its value as a scienti c tool. Rather, we are merely following the requirements of good logic. Logically, it is impossible to explain something you cannot in the rst place describe to some degree of accuracy and completeness. Because existing systems of description in psychology and arti cial intelligence are defective, we need to establish a descriptive idiom that will work. Description must come before explanation. But there is also the possibility that, once an adequate, detailed an complete description of behavior has been achieved, there might be nothing left to explain.
It should be noted that behavior descriptions are not identical to performance. Behavior descriptions encompass the goal, knowledge, skill and performance parameters. Thus, performance is only one of the parameters of behavior descriptions.
Formal behavior descriptions
In this section we describe the formalization of behavior descriptions. We then show h o w these descriptions can be used to document computational systems. Documentation is essential for understanding the operation of programs and for their maintenance. Good documentation can aid the reuse of program designs. It can also aid the growth or expansion of the system, and the reuse of program design when the purpose, or use-in-practice, of the system changes. The problem of reusing programs and their designs cannot be solved from symbol level considerations alone. We m ust relate symbol level computations to abstract level descriptions.
While we are concerned with KBS in complex domains we shall begin by discussing examples in the eld of set theory. T h i s c hoice was made in order to illustrate our ideas clearly, i n a concrete and widely understood domain. In section 4 we address the more complex problem of documenting a KBS.
A b e h a vior description is de ned by the 4-tuple <G K S P> . One or more behavior descriptions may be associated with an agent. The components of the behavior description conform to the following speci cation, where each description is speci ed with respect to a particular conceptual theory.
<G K S P>is a behavior description, in a conceptual theory C, where: G :de nes the goal which the behavior description can satisfy, the formal language is predicate calculus (extended as de ned below). K :de nes knowledge related to the solution of the goal the formal language is predicate calculus. S :describes skills which perform the computation de ned in K, the notation is that of functional programming. P :describes the performance of the skills, i.e. one or more concrete examples of the input-output relation, the formal description is speci ed by the programming language.
The predicate calculus is extended by the addition of predicates which represent concepts in set theory, for example, set union is formalized by: (A B C). However, for clarity, w e shall use the standard in x notation of set theory and write C = A B to represent union. In other domains, predicate calculus may not be the most appropriate formal language. In such cases K and G may be described in any suitable formal language which p r o vides appropriate semantics and rules of inference.
It is required that a function, h 0 , m ust actually exist at the concrete level, in some programming language, before we can con rm the existence of the skill, h. This guarantees that we can obtain examples of actual performances P of the skills. Performances are indexed by t h e skill they are produced by, the concrete level function name, and the programming language the concrete function is speci ed in. This method of documentation includes information which can be seen as validating the concrete level code.
The relationships between the various components of the behavior description are illustrated by example in the following documentations of programs.
Example 1: Set union.
In the framework of simple set theory the union of two sets, A B, is a set which contains all members of A and all members of B. E l e m e n ts which occur in both A and B occur only once in the union set. The computation of the union of two sets can be considered to be composed of two operations: the construction of a set C, obtained from B by removing all elements which also occur in A, and then the combination of A and C to yield the output set D. The former computation we c a l l di and the latter concatenate. The computation is illustrated diagrammatically in gure 1 2 , w h i c h shows the relationship between data classes and skills. The documentation of this computation in terms of behavior descriptions is given in table 1.
The goal is a summary of the computation, namely that for any s e t s A and B the union, D, can be calculated. The knowledge component speci es the distinctions which decompose the goal into an equivalent set of formulae, from which the skills can be derived. Formula kaw1.eps 0pt 0pt Table 1 : The behavior description for Union.
i. de nes the union operator in terms of set membership and ii. de nes an equivalent breakdown of the rhs. of i. which i n troduces the set C i.e. the set whose members are in B but not in A. The skill C = di (B,A) is associated with the distinctions de ned by the expression (f C$ f B^f 6 A). The skill D = concatenate(A,C) is associated with (f D$ f A_ f C)), however in this case the context is important a s A and C are guaranteed to be disjoint. This association is behavioral, i.e. the skill e ects the calculation speci ed by the knowledge component, as is witnessed by the performance. Where it is possible to prove equivalence between the knowledge component and the concrete function, this is desirable. However, we a c knowledge that this may not always be possible in all domains.
LISP, P R OLOG and C de nitions of the di and concatenate skills were de ned according the decomposition de ned above. It is notable that the structure of the conceptual model of the computation was maintained, for imperative, functional and logic-based programming languages.
It is also possible to de ne set union as one skill C = union-1 (A,B) , that is, the skill corresponds to the rhs. of i. In this case the function, at the concrete level, is a synthesis of the di and concatenate functions. The performance of this new concrete level function is not necessarily the same as that de ned in 1. In fact, in the case of LISP, the performance di ers in the ordering of the elements of the output list, D. This di erence is not signi cant at the abstract level, in the framework of simple set theory.
The behavior description can therefore document several alternative solutions of the goal. As in the previous case, the knowledge de nes an expansion of the goal into a form where skills can be de ned. The skills, or, more precisely, their concrete level counterparts, actually carry out the computation and the performance is recorded. Again, LISP, P R OLOG and C versions of this computation were de ned using the same abstract model.
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Figure 2: An inference structure for con guration 4 The documentation of a con guration system
For the simple programs considered so far, it was possible to give a precise de nition of the knowledge of set theory represented in the programs. In this section we s h o w h o w our approach can be scaled up to describe a conventional KBS. We describe a KBS which solves the Sisyphus task of con guring elevator systems (Yost, 1992) . Due to space considerations we present only a part of the entire solution.
The Sisyphus task involves the con guration of elevators according to a given design. The aim is to nd a con guration which satis es a number of constraints. We shall not describe the derivation of our solution, in fact we used an approach similar to the KADS methodology 3 (Breuker and Wielinga, 1989 ), instead we shall focus on the documentation of the solution.
A KBS will typically be comprised of function de nitions which de ne the problem solving steps and a knowledge base (KB) which de nes domain speci c information. The function de nitions will normally be task speci c but domain independent, as will the schema of the KB. Our solution of the Sisyphus task has exactly this design. It was derived after a knowledge level analysis of the task was performed. The resulting inference structure is shown in gure 2. The method should be understood as beginning with the selection of a Component from the Design, determining a number of Parameters which determine the consistency of this choice, and their values. The checking of the consistency of the choice of component is done by t h e id-remedy knowledge source which nds a replacement component, Remedy, i f a n y constraints are violated.
The documentation of the KBS must characterise two distinct types of knowledge: the domain knowledge of the KBS, and the method of the con guration algorithm. The knowledge about the attributes of a particular motor is represented in table 3. The Knowledge component is a formalization of the domain knowledge as arguments of the predicates instance-of and has-attribute. These predicates have the usual interpretation. The Skill component i s the construction of a list where slots in the design are assigned the appropriate value. There is only one possible performance, the slots get the correct values.
The con guration algorithm consists of the recursive function con gure, which is de ned in terms of two further functions, increment-design and identify-remedy, one list processing function and functions de ned in the KB. In order to document t h e con gure function we must specify the goal which it satis es:
Construct Design = con gure(Speci cation)
We consider the knowledge of con gure to be a formalized representation of the inference structure which resulted from the knowledge level analysis. The meta-classes of the infer- Table 3 : Domain knowledge about the motor model 10HP ence structure are captured by predicates whose logical domains are sets of domain terms. The dependency of meta-classes upon one another is represented by implications, and the appropriate quanti cation of variables. For example, in our inference structure the knowledge source select selects a Component to be con gured, given the con guration Design. states that for all designs a component can be selected, ii. states that if a component has been selected then a design must exist. These formulae de ne the key data classes of the domain and specify a number of consistency relationships which m ust hold. Each knowledge source of the inference structure is described in a similar way and the resulting set of formulae describe a set of relations which hold in the inference structure as a whole 4 . This method of describing the inference structure does not de ne how components are selected, or when, in control terms, the selection inference is made, these aspects are speci ed in the Skill component.
The Skill component is simply the ordered listing of the de nition of con gure. Details such as terminating conditions are omitted to leave the essential structure of the algorithm. The Performance component is an example of an execution of the con gure function. The documentation of the KBS di ers from the documentation of the set theory programs in that domain knowledge must be described. This is unproblematic. The knowledge of the algorithm, that is, the knowledge of the solution method implemented by the algorithm, cannot be expressed in such a w ay that the KL de nition predicts the symbol level performance. This is a known feature of the knowledge level, the KL cannot be reduced to the symbol level. The set theory programs are exceptional in that the symbol level behavior is precisely that predicted by the Knowledge component, within the physical limitations of the computer which performs the calculation.
In contrast with the KADS approach, we h a ve not speci ed an implementation where the inference structure is represented as a distinct layer of the design. Instead, we h a ve produced a design which can be easily related to the inference structure and this simpli ed the implementation. The documentation of our solution includes examples of runs of the program, hence our approach is more empirical than the purely rationalistic KADS method.
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Sharing and reuse
The idea of signi cance as related to context is important in our approach to the reuse of behavior descriptions. Consider, for example, that you observe an application of the concatenate function:
concatenate((()(1)(2)(2 1))((3)(3 1)(3 2)(3 2 1))) = (()(1)(2)(2 1)(3)(3 1)(3 2)(3 2 1))
This function would just be described as concatenating two sets. However, if the following piece of information is added:
powerset((2 1)) = (()(1)(2)(2 1)) then we can see that the rst argument o f concatenate is the powerset of the set (2 1). I f w e now add two more pieces of information:
repeated-union((3),(()(1)(2)(2 1)) = ((3)(3 1)(3 2)(3 2 1)) and split((3 2 1)) = <(3), (2 1) > we can see that the second argument o f concatenate is the list formed by adding (3) to the powerset of (2 1) and that these elements were once composed into a single list (3 2 1). Taken together these functions de ne an algorithm which computes the powerset of a set. The signi cance of the particular application of the concatenate function increases as more information about the context in which the evaluation occurs becomes known. We h a ve, of course, only described the process of understanding the signi cance of the concatenate function in one particular instance, the problem of designing algorithms such a s p o werset is not addressed here.
In general, we view the signi cance of a computation as increasing as it becomes embedded in greater and greater contexts, i.e. as the system grows. The problem is to describe and redescribe the computation as this growth happens in order that reuse can occur. Behavior descriptions capture the information required for this purpose.
The complete behavior description of the powerset function is shown in table 4. The computation of this function can be de ned recursively as is shown in gure 3. The powerset Y , o f set A, is the set of all subsets of A. The basic insight required to derive the computational method from the requirements is to note that the powerset of a set A can be calculated from the powerset of A minus element B and the set formed by adding B to every subset of D.
The method is to split one element, B, of the input set A, to obtain set C. Performance: 1. A =`(2 1), Y =`(()(1)(2)(2 1)) skill = a, powerset, LISP] 2. A =`(3 2 1) Y =`(()(1)(2)(2 1)(3)(3 1)(3 2)(3 2 1)) skill = a, powerset, LISP] Table 4 : The behavior description of powerset.
Conclusions
We h a ve de ned behavior descriptions in order to overcome a number of problems with xed ontologies. We h a ve s h o wn how b e h a vior descriptions can be formalized and illustrated our proposals by a n umber of simple examples from set theory. The documentation of a knowledge-based system for the Sisyphus task demonstrates how our approach can be scaled up.
The knowledge level is a rational approach for describing the behavior of a computational system. In addition to this descriptive function, the knowledge level is also used in the development o f K B S . T ypically, declaratively represented knowledge plays a speci c role in a problem solving model, however, the documentation of such a system relies on a xed interpretation. In contrast, our approach is more evolutionary (K uhn, 1993) . Behavior descriptions may c hange over time. We do not separate the description of the requirements from the description of the implementation (Swartout and Balzer, 1982) and the system is not viewed as being divorced from the environment i n w h i c h i t i s u s e d .
From Clancey's discussion of the frame of reference problem we can conclude that there may be di erent descriptions for the same system depending upon context. Pursuing this argument, we consider it inevitable that systems will be redescribed for di erent c o n texts and purposes. This contrasts with the view of a xed ontology based upon a uniform KL descriptions. For allowing such conceptual changes on KBS and programs, we proposed the behavior descriptions and provided a formalization which can be used for documentation. Such documentation consists of, 1) the goal or purpose the KBS is used for, 2) the distinctions and categorizations which are made by the system, i.e. representation of declarative knowledge, 3) the computational procedures which are implemented b y the system and correspond to the categorization made by the encoded declarative k n o wledge and 4) the actually observed input-output relations (i.e. the performance of the system on selected test cases).
If the use of a system is not to be limited by the designer's preconceptions, then the abstract descriptions of a system have t o b e c hanged according to the new purposes which users may invent. We h a ve s h o wn how behavior descriptions are adjusted to new purposes by assessing the already existing behavior description in the light of the newly emerging conceptualization. It is often assumed that knowledge sharing and reuse is to accomplished by specifying a (rather) xed ontology, w h i c h is agreed upon by all designers and users. The proposed behavior descriptions provide the exibility of describing and redescribing systems according to the current purposes. Behavior descriptions thus allow for the sharing and reuse of knowledge as well as for conceptual changes over time (Keil, 1993 Ram, 1993 . Speci c representation languages may be required for forming such descriptions. A declarative language for which allows for knowledge evolution is currently being developed in the VEGA project (Boley, 1993) .
We view reuse as a problem of the redescription of computational systems in larger contexts.
Components of a system gain signi cance by being embedded, for example, the concatenate function was reused in the powerset function. Another example is the reuse of calculations in a spreadsheet environment b y e m bedding them in a larger work ow e.g. for paying travel expenses (see for example, Dallemagne et. al., 1992) . We h a ve n o t y et presented a technology for reuse, but we h a ve laid some of the theoretical groundwork for such a technology.
